This paper exploits discontinuities in the assigment of scholarships targeted at low income students in an Italian University in order to evaluate the effects of monetary incentives on students' academic achievement. Results reveal positive and sizeable causal effects both in terms of credits and grades. Gender differentials also emerge: male students drive the results on credits outcome while females students drive the effect on grades. These results suggest that the scholarship design contributes to reducing the probability of delayed graduation ("Fuori Corso" problem).
Introduction
Given the extensive social and private benefits that result from tertiary education, inclusive access and a well functioning system are essential for achieving social justice and enhancing national human capital. Furthermore, if one considers the strong correlation between tertiary education enrollment and family background (McPherson and Schapiro, 2006) , concrete and effective initiatives are necessary to provide better opportunities of access and success for students from lower income families and minority groups.
In Italy, the "Right to Study" Constitutional principle responds to such equity purposes by providing different types of services for students from lower income family who want to enroll at an university program. In this research, I focus on the "Right to Study Scholarship". In particular, I analyze how the monetary provision of such scholarship causally impact on students' academic achievements by applying a Regression Discontinuity analysis.
I interested in understanding whether these monetary incentives could serve to boost students' performance by reducing direct and indirect college costs. Moreover, since the maintenance and non-reimbursement of the mean-tested scholarship are conditional on the achievement of minimum credit requirements, the analysis gives the opportunity to understand whether such requirements are adequately defined in order to serve the purpose of enhancing students' performance and the extent to which they could alleviate the problem of being "Fuori Corso" (delayed graduation), which is a wide-spread phenomenon in many countries (see, For what concerns the case of Italy, the evidence is not uniform and the present study ought to provide new insights on the issue. In particular, Garibaldi et al. (2012) find that an increase in college cost, in response to delayed graduation, exerts a remarkable effect on the on-time completion rate, using evidence from Bocconi University. In line with this evidence, I find that monetary incentives speed up the number of credits a student achieves in the first year of the degree without prejudice to, but actually increasing, average grades. This effect can arguably help the "Fuori Corso" problem. In other words, the need-based scholarship leads low-income students to exert more efforts in order to meet minimum credit requirements and to avoid losing their grants (which is equivalent to an increase in university costs).
De Paola et. al (2010) find that "financial rewards increase student performance both in terms of number of credits acquired and grades obtained at exams". My results are in line with such evidence, even if their institutional context is different with respect the one analyzed here. In fact, they analyzed the effect of an extra reward financed through the European Social Found for above-average students, which could not give the same incentives as the Right to Study Scholarship.
Mealli and Rampichini (2012) have, instead, analyzed data regarding four Italian universities and they show that the "Right to Study Scholarship" (which is the same Italian institution that we here analyze) prevents students from droping-out. However, they find that the effect vanishes for lower income students. Here we provide new evidence from the "Right to Study Scholarship" at the University of Bologna showing that such effects on performance for lower income students are not only significant but are also remarkably large.
My results are also at odds with Schizzerotto et al. (2012) who studies the effect of a meritbased scholarship at the University of Trento and do not find any significant effect on academic achievement. Such contrast might have to do with the fact that they use a relatively small sample from survey data, which are more sensible to measurement errors. In my case, the administrative dataset I use allows to gain precision on the estimates. The paper is organized as follow. The next section outlines how the present study relates to the literature developed so far. Section 3 analyzes the institutional framework and Section 4 describes the data and methodology. In section 5, I will present and discuss results on the causal effects of scholarships on different measures of academic achievement. Section 6 discusses the robustness of the findings and Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
In recent years a growing number of interventions designed to increase tertiary education enrolment, completion and effectiveness took place. A number of these programs targeted low income Moreover, it has been shown that the effort provided by students in schooling activities is one of the most important factors in the human capital accumulation, possibly more effective than teacher quality and school resources (Costrell, 1994; Bonesronning, 2004) .
Further justifications come from the fact that, in economic theory, monetary aids are supposed to act as incentives promoting effort and scholastic performance (Lazear 2000) being, therefore, helpful in reducing the still nowadays large percentage of young students who face severe problems in educational choice. It is well documented, in fact, that the share of students who drops-out the tertiary education is commonly high even in developed countries and that time to degree completion has increased remarkably in the last two decades. 1 Therefore, the interest in how such aid programs are related to students' performance started to grow in economic research. However, there seems to be much room from further research since results are by no means univocal: some studies provide evidence of a positive impact, while others find rather weak effects. This hints at the necessity of better understanding of how different policy designs implicate in different effects on performance and how these effects vary across different groups of subjects.
In non-experimental research the effectiveness of academic support services is mixed and do not provide a realiable causal measure of such relationship (e. For what concerns Europe, Leuven et al. (2003) analyze the effect of merit-based rewards for students enrolled at the University of Amsterdam. They find that only high-ability students and those with highly educated fathers obtain better academic achievement when assigned to the high reward group. For the whole sample taken together instead, there was no effect. Belot et al. (2007) exploit a Dutch reform in the educational system in order to understand the effect of student assistance on academic performance and students' time allocation. They find that there is a small positive effect on the grades but drop-out and time allocation of students remain basically unchanged. De Paola et al. (2010) analyze the effect of a randomly assigned merit-reward for students enrolled at University of Calabria. They find positive effects of the monetary incentives on average grades. Garibaldi et al. (2012) find that at Bocconi University in Milan, the increase in the tuition payments for "Fuori Corso" students, i.e their enrollment in the university system extended beyond the legal length of their program, exert a remarkable effect on on-time completion rate. Mealli and Rampichini (2012) analyze data regarding four Italian universities and show how public provided university scholarships, under the "Right to Study Scholarship", prevent drop-out for those students from medium income families, while for poorer students the effects are not significant. Schizzerotto et al. (2012) looks instead at the incentives assigned to students from low income families introduced in a well-defined area in the North-East of Italy, the administrative province of Trento. They find no effect whatsoever on the drop-out rate, the average mark and the number of credits achieved.
In sum, from a broad review of the recent empirical literature, it becomes clear that the overall evidence on the effect of monetary incentives is rather controversial, ranging from studies finding no effects whatsoever to studies finding large and positive effects on performance.
The goal of this paper is to enrich this debate showing the results of a mean-tested program carried out in the Italian context. In particular, I try to disentangle the pure effect of the so called "Right to Study Scholarship" from other confounding factors on students' academic achievement through applying a Regression Discontinuity Design. The idea underlying the "Right to StudyScholarship" is to reduce the cost related to tertiary education attendance in order to prevent low family income students from being excluded, drop-out, or under-perform with respect to other pupils due to financial constraints. This study show how such institution could be used to serve the additional pourposes of reducing the percentage of "Fuori Corso" students and, more generally, in fostering the accumulation of human capital.
The Institutional Framework
Tertiary education in Italy is generally accessible to students with an high school diploma, independently of the type obtained (scientific, classical, professional). Moreover, the Italian Constitution states in art. 34 that University education should be accessible also to those students who do not have the financial resources and the that the Italian Republic furthers the realization of the, so called, "Right to Study" by providing scholarship and other allowances to students.
"Pupils of ability and merit, even if lacking financial resources, have the right to attain the highest grades of studies. The republic furthers the realization of this right by scholarships, allowances to families, and other provisions, to be assigned through competitive examinations."
To enhance equal opportunity and fair access, the region offers many types of services: allowances for international mobility, housing and meals services, services for people with disability, vouchers for education programs (Master, High-level education, etc.), fiduciary loans, and parttime working possibilities. The present study will be focused on the "Right to Study Scholarships" offered for the University of Bologna. The "Right to study Scholarship", from now on "RSS", is one of the services provided by the Region of Emilia-Romagna, where the University of Bologna is located, to promote access and equity in education. In particular this research want to measure what are the effects of such monetary incentives on students' academic achievement.
The "Right to Study" service in Emilia-Romagna has generally a large coverage, both in terms of the number of recipients and of the amount of financial resources provided. Specifically, 13.475 students received a RSS over a total of 98.357 students in the region (13,7%) for the 2008/2009 academic year. 2 Furthermore, to finance the RSS for the same academic year, the Region of EmiliaRomagna collected: from national resources e151.986.000, from regional resources e158.120.201 , from regional taxes e171.085.441, making a total of e481.191.642. 3 In this perspective, it becomes quite important to know how these grants shape students' incentives and, in particular, whether they have any effects on students' academic achievements, 2 Data from "Ministry of Education, University and Research -MIUR" 3 Data from "Ministry of Education, University and Research -MIUR" especially in Italy where students' profiles and performance are quite peculiar. In fact, it has been estimated 4 that 36% of students are "Fuori Corso", i.e those whose their enrollment in the university system extended beyond the legal length of their program, and 21,7% of students dropout. Moreover, the OECD 5 estimates that in Italy 23,2% of young in the 15-29 age bracket are NEET-Not in Education, Employment, or Training and that the employment rates of the youths in 25-29 age bracket is one of the smallest in Europe. In this context, therefore, proper monetary incentive schemes could play a role not only in providing fair access to the University but also in fostering students' performances and enriching national human capital, as through the prevention of university drop-out and the reduction of the share of "Fuori Corso" students.
The regional agency appointed for the distribution of the "Right to Study" services is ER.GO and from 2008 onward, the agency have fully covered all the scholarship' applicants, a 100% successful rate. The application to scholarships is made before the academic year starts. 6 Results on allowance eligibility are published within few months and the first installment of the grant (50% of the yearly allowance) is paid due the end of calendar year. The second half of the financial transfer is bind to the satisfaction of precise credit requirements, which are known ex-ante.
The scholarships differ according to the student status which depends on their place of residence: "In sede", i.e their university's course is in the city of residence or they do not live more than 45 minutes far (by public transport) from the university's center; "Fuori sede", i.e their university's course is more than 90 minutes far (by public transport) away from the city of residence, "Pendolari", i.e their university's course is between 45 and 90 minutes away from the city of residence.
There is no distinction, on the other hand, with respect to the level of their degree. Within groups, "In Sede", "Fuori Sede", "Pendolari", scholarships are assigned according to three thresholds on one income indicator of the family, ISEE. Furthermore, eligibility is always conditional on a maximum value of a further wealth indicator of the family, ISPE, which shall not exceed e32.320,64.
The ISEE indicator is given by the annual after-tax income plus the 20% of family assets, adjusted for the family size by means of an equivalence scale; the ISPE is instead an indicator based just 4 AlmaLaurea -Annual Report on University' Graduates 2013 5 Education at la glance 2013 6 At the University of Bologna all the courses start from September/ October to June/July of each year.
on the family assets and it is adjusted for the family size by means of an equivalence scale. The amount of scholarships are the following: On the top of credit requirements, there are also "credits bonus". The design of the RSS offers the possibility to students to use credits bonus, ie. they can add a limited numbers of credit bonus Recipients can take advantage of using current year remaining credit bonus in further years, however these are not cumulative.
Data and Methodology
The data are provided by the regional agency which is in charge of delivering the RSS, ER.GO, and by the University of Bologna. The advantage to use administrative data is that observations on performance and income status are more precise than survey data, therefore it allows for more precise estimates and decreases the risk of measurement errors biases.
The academic year of reference is the 2008/2009 and the sample includes all the freshman admitted in all the twenty three faculties of the University of Bologna. 7 The data set includes students enrolled at different levels of Tertiary education: Undergraduate level and Master level. The data set also includes information on students' demographic characterstics and on university-related variables: high-school grade, credits and average mark obtained, university center (Bologna, Forlì, Cesena, Rimini, Ravenna), faculty, graduation course, type of scholarship obtained ("In Sede", "Fuori Sede", Pendolari"), ISEE and ISPE. Table 3 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for the sample of students. About 60% percent of the students are female. The average age is 21 years old. The geographical distribution is quite symmetric as 37% of students are coming from the North, 26% from the Center, 28% from the South of Italy and 9% are foreign students. The High School grade in Italy ranges from 60 to 100; the sample mean equals 81.6 points. The high school grade is set to missing for foreign students since I do not have enough information to perfectly convert the foreign scale into the Italian ones.
The average number of credits obtained during the first year of enrollment is around 31 with an average grade of 26. Some data on average grade were missing in the data provided by ER.GO and could not be recovered until the time being. "In Sede" and "Fuori Sede" scholarships' students are quite evenly distributed in the sample.
In order to study the effect of scholarships on students' performances, I use a Regression Discontinuity Design. The RDD has been largely used in economics and behavioral sciences and was firstly introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960). The attractiveness of such design is that it allows to identify and estimate treatment effects in a context similar to a formal randomized experiment. In particular, data on random assignment of treatment and control groups are commonly used in medical analysis. In economic research and, precisely, in the evaluation of social programs, the use of random assignment is mostly controversial and remains unusual. Under this perspective, RDD succeeds in establishing soft conditions that allow to identify and estimate treatment effect on observational studies, without relying on parametric evaluation model, often criticized in the literature (for example Lalonde(1986)).
The identification and estimation issues for the RDD were formalized in the work of Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001), which describes the minimum set of conditions under which it possible to nonparametrically identify the treatment effect.
It is typically imagined that, for each individual i, there exists two potential outcomes:
if the unit is exposed to the treatment and Z i (0) if not exposed. 
In our setting, the set of outcome variables, Z i , consists of: number of credits and average mark In order to aggregate students with ISEE near the two thresholds, c i = (c 1 , c 2 ), I constructed a new variable Y i that is define by: bracket. In this way we are not confounding the scholarships' incentives of students near the first threshold with those of students near the second threshold, and the ones of students near the second threshold with those near the third threshold.
From the treatment analysis on the two thresholds, I will estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In particular:
where the Z i s a vector of outcomes variable, F (Y i ) is a polynomial of 4th degree on the constructed variable defined as Y i , D i is the dummy variable taking value equal to 1 if students are assigned to the higher scholarship. Then it is possible to demonstrate that:
is an unbiased estimator of the LATE.
Results
The results are drawn combining data of students who have a value of ISEE near the first and the second scholarships' thresholds (e11.927,35 and e14.909,19 respectively). By aggregating those data, the analysis gains in term of precision but we lose information on how the effects of interest vary with the ISEE and with the students' status ("In Sede", Fuori Sede", "Pendolari"). The results are presented in Table 4 .
The local average treatment effects are estimated allowing for different polynomials on the two sides of the aggregated threshold. To check for the robustness of the results, I use four specifications with polynomials of different degrees, from the 1st to the 4th degree. As standars in such methodology, when I increase the order of the polynomial form, I simultaneously enlarge the observational range in order to avoid losing the precision of estimates. More precisely, for the 1st polynomial degree I used a bandwidth of ± e500 around the aggregate ISEE threshold. For the 2nd degree, I add e350 obtaining a range of ± e850 while for the 3rd degree we use those observation lying around ± e1200 with respect the aggregate threshold. For the 4th degree we use a bandwidth of ± e1400, the maximum possible range (half of the distance between the first and second threshold).
As it is shown in table 4, students who receive an higher scholarship amount, on average e840 more, have better results on academic achievement during the first year of university enrollment.
In particular, according to the specification used, students with the higher scholarship acquire from 9 to 18 credits more with respect to students with a lower scholarship during the frist year. Considering that the regular number of credits for the first year is 60 and that the average number of credits obtained in the sample is around 32, the size of the effect is arguably large (from 28% to 56%).
The average of first year grades of those students with higher scholarships is around 2 points higher than the one of those with a lower financing. The grades scale in Italy ranges from 18 (sufficiency grade) to 30 points (plus laude). Since the sample mean of the average first year grade is of about 26 points, the estimated causal effect of an e840 higher scholarship is of about the 7% on the average mark.
It is important to notice that, fellowship need not be reimboursed if the credit requirements is achieved. Students aiming at fullfilling this requirement only may pass more exams but with lower grades. I check if this is the case by looking at the effect on students' GPA at the end of the year.
Pure credit requirements seem to be sufficient to increase students' performance not only in terms of credit achievement but also with respect to marks. In fact, as shown in the Panel C, an index of performance (made out of an average on normalized credit achievement and average marks) jumps of about 0.1 decimal points for students with the higher scholarship.
Finally, I analyze the effect on the probability of having satisfy the credits requirements for the maintenance of the scholarship, which are set equal to 25 (30) credits for the undergraduate (master) students. The average rate of success in the sample is of about 78%, a fairly large fraction.
Nevertheless, the results show that the monetary incentives still have a positive effect on the probability of having satisfied this requirement. In fact, the effect goes from a minimum of 0.22 points to a maximum of 0.47 probability points, which is equal to an average percentage effect of 28% and 60% respectively. What is clear from the analysis is that the current scholarship design could be further used as an effective instrument for reducing the percentage of "Fuori Corso" students.
It is interest to contrast this overall finding, that the RSS boosts students' achievement, with They do not find any significant effect for the lower income students. This is in contrast with the present results which are focused on lower income students.
I proceed with the analysis in Table 5 by looking at the scholarships' effects on the probability of obtaining the total number of credits expected for the first year of enrolment at the date of 10
August 2009, which we take as an indicator directly related to the probability to be "Fuori Corso". 9 Although these results have a positive sign (around 0.1 points) and seem to be fairly stable over the different polynomial specifications, they are not significant. Given that the analysis above suggets that the minimum credit requirements may have significant effects on performance (credits, grades and probability of meeting the requirement itself), a possible experimentation for policy would be making such minimum requirements closer to the regular number of credits expected from students along the years (60 credits per year). This could allow the RSS to more effectively serve the purpose of reducing the share of "Fuori Corso" students.
In order to gain more insight on the underlying relationship between the monetary incentives
and students performance, I analyze treatments effects on the two thresholds separately. The average increase on the scholarship amount at the first threshold is of around e950 while the difference at the second threshold is mildly smaller, around e730. The estimates are reported in Tables 6 and   7 .
For the first threshold, I find positive and significant effects for all the outcome variables. For the second threshold instead, results are less clear cut. Treatment effects are only significant on the number of credits and on the probability of having satisfied the maintenance requirements.
Considering that the sample size and estimated standard errors are similar around both thresholds, such results suggest that the scholarship is more effective in boosting academic performance of lower income students. Even if we consider that the average increase in grants around the second threshold is about 24% lower, the decrease in the size of the effect on the number of credits achieved and average grade is fairly lower than that. This interpretation suggests that policy makers could allocate a higher share of funds to the less well-off recipients if the goal is to increase the number of credits and grades.
Finally, I investigate how treatment effects change within sub-groups of population. More specifically, I firstly analyze the results by students status, "Fuori Sede", "In sede" and "Pendolari, and, 9 "Fuori Corso" status is assigned when the student do not acquire 60 credits at the 31/03/2010.
unfortunately, I do not find any significant and consistent result for our different specifications. The same happens when differentiating for Undergraduate and Master students. This may suggests that the sample is not large enough to allow us to obtain precise enough estimates on these subgroups.
However, I was able to successfully exploit differences in effects between female and male students. Results are reported in the Table 8 and 9, for female and male respectively. I find that the large and significant scholarship effects on credit achievement are mostly driven by male students.
Although still positive, these effects for female are smaller and not significant. On the other hand, the previous aggregate results on average grades are mainly driven by female students and they are still positive but not significant for male. These results show that monetary incentives are differently perceived between male and female students, as it is found in previous literature. In the present research, I find pure monetary incentives to be effective in raising the academic performance of both genders, but in a heterogeneous way. For male, the significant effect is on credit achievement, while for female it is on grades.
Robustness
In order to further assess the validity of our results, I perform a standard graphical analysis both on treatment and pre-treatment variables. Results are reported in Figures 1 and 2 . I allow for a 4th order polynomial on both side of the threshold and show a 90% confidence interval around estimates. As it is possible to see, the graphical analysis confirms the results found with regressions estimates. For all the treatment variables (except for the average for which results is less clear cut), we find a significant and positive jump before the aggregate threshold, meaning that those students just before the threshold, i.e with an higher scholarship, perform better than those just after it, i.e with a lower scholarship.
Since it is impossible to test for the continuity assumption directly, I can test some implications of it. More specifically, all the pre-treatment characteristics should have identical distribution, at the limit, on the two sides of the cutoff. Therefore, in order to test for the validity of our identification strategy, I test for a discontinuity in all of our pre-treatment variables applying the same four specifications used for the post-treatment outcomes. I find no significant discontinuity on these in any of these covariates, which is reassuring for the validity of our identification strategy. These results are reported in Table 10 .
In Figure 2 I show instead a graphical analysis on these pre-treatment covariates: Sex, Age, High-School Grade, ISPE, Probability to be "Fuori Sede" students. Once more, I find no significant jump in any of the pretreatment variables. Average High-School Grade seems to be higher for those students with the higher scholarship, but, as shown in the regression estimates, this difference is not significant. Moreover, I test further for this possible ability bias by looking at the probability to be "Fuori Sede". In fact, if students with higher High-School Grade, decide to go to college only if they get higher scholarships, I should see a jump in the probability to be "Fuori Sede" since these are those getting higher grants. Estimates show that this is not the case.
A further important issue to the validity of the identification strategy has to do with manip- Concluding, after performing all these robustness tests, we should be confident on the validity of the identification strategy and on the estimates of the Local Average Treatment Effects of the scholarship on students' academic performance.
Conclusions
This paper has studied the role of monetary incentives in an educational context. In economic theoy, monetary incentives are the standard tool to shape indiviual actions and effort and, nowadays, many policy interventions are designed in order to use this principle to influence individual decision making. Recently, more and more attention is dedicated on how financial incentives could serve also to condition students behavior in their academic studies. The present paper, in particular, is focused on a public insistution designed principally to provide fair access and equal opportunity in higher education. As it emerges from the results of this research, the scholarships provided for low-income students, could not only respond to the equity purpose cited above, but they could also be used as active tools to boost students performances. In particular, I found that on average e840 more will bring students to get from 9 to 18 credits more by the end of the year, with gains also for their GPA, i.e around two points more (the 7% of the average mark). Moreover, I found that the scholarships are more effective in this purpose for lower income students (first threshols results), suggesting that policy maker who wants to magnify such effect should allocate more and/or higher scholarship for this type of students. In line with the literature, I also find gender gaps. In particular, female students drive the results on the GPA (probably because they acquire already an above average amount of credits) while male students drive the finding on credits. The results presented seem to be valid and robust to different consistency checks as I shown in the robustness section.
With the present paper, I want to add new causal evidence on how financial incentives shape individual actions, particularly in an educational context. I find that pure monetary incentives can significantly increase academic performance in a context of lower income students. Moreover, the aim of this research is also to provide recommendations for policy maker on how to properly design instutions that want to effectively boost academic perfromances. Further research should explain through which channel the financial incentives are working. In particular, is suggested to acquire additional information in order to understand if students are studying better just because of the threath of loosing the scholarship and/or because they have a positive shock on their income, with consequences on their labor supply. Responding to such questions, will allow to better target the scholarship and the related requirements. Note. OLS estimates of equation:
Appendix
where Z i is the vector of outcomes variables (Credits, Average Grade, Performance, P(Credit Requirements)); F (Y i ) is a vector whose elements are two polynomials (one for each side of the threshold) in the absolute difference between the ISEE declaration and the thresholds ; D i is a dummy taking value 1 for students on the left side of the threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note. OLS estimates of equation:
where Z i is the outcomes variable P(Regular Credit Requirements). Credit Requirements is a dummy taking value 1 for students who have completed, at least, 60 credits in the academic year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
where Z i is the vector of outcomes variables (Credits, Average Grade, Performance, P(Credit Requirements)); F (Y i ) is a vector whose elements are two polynomials (one for each side of the threshold) in the absolute difference between the ISEE declaration and the thresholds ; D i is a dummy taking value 1 for students on the left side of the threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
where Z i is the vector of outcomes variables (Credits, Average Grade, Performance, P(Credits' Requirements)); F (Y i ) is a vector whose elements are two polynomials (one for each side of the threshold) in the absolute difference between the ISEE declaration and the thresholds ; D i is a dummy taking value 1 for students on the left side of the threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
where Z i is the vector of outcomes variables (Credits, Average Grade, Performance, P(Credits' Requirements)); F (Y i ) is a vector whose elements are two polynomials (one for each side of the threshold) in the absolute difference between the ISEE declaration and the thresholds ; D i is a dummy taking value 1 for students on the left side of the threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Note. OLS estimates of equation:
where V i is the vector of pre-treatment variables (Sex, Age, High-School Grade, ISPE, P(Fuori Sede)); F (Y i ) is a vector whose elements are two polynomials (one for each side of the threshold) in the absolute difference between the ISEE declaration and the thresholds ; D i is a dummy taking value 1 for students on the left side of the threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Figure 1: Graphical Anlysis of Local Average Treatment Effect
Note. The central line is a spline fourth-order polynomial in family income indicator, fitted separately on each side of the aggregate threshold at zero (family income is normalized as the distance from the above or below threshold in symmetric intervals). The lateral lines are the 90% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over 100-unit intervals. The Credits outcome is the number of credits obtained in the first year of enrolment. The Average is the average grade obtained in the first year of enrolment. Performance is a constructed index of academic achievement that combined both the credits and the grades' average outcomes. P(Satisfy Credits' Requirements) is the probability of having satisfy the requirements for the maintenance and non-rembursement of the scholarship at the end of the first year.
Figure 2: Evidence on sorting and continuity conditions
Note. The central line is a spline fourth-order polynomial in family income indicator, fitted separately on each side of the aggregate threshold at zero (family income is normalized as the distance from the above or below threshold in symmetric intervals). The lateral lines are the 90% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over 100-unit intervals. The Sex outcome is the probability of being female students. Age is the students'age at the enrolment in the first year of study. High-School Grade is the final grade in the high-school diploma. ISPE is an indicator on family assets. P("Fuori Sede") is the probability of receiving the highest "Fuori Sede" scholarship.
